Legal humanism has become deeply entrenched in most modern works on European legal history from the 17th century onwards and has been accepted with such blind faith by many modern scholars that few have challenged it. As a result, it has been used to substantiate larger claims about the deathof Roman law, the separation between the golden age of a pan-European medieval ius commune and the fragmented reception of Roman law into the nation states of Europe, and the relevance of (...) 'dogmatic' Roman law as opposed to 'antiquarian' Roman law.Now, the traditional grand narratives of European legal history have begun to be questioned, to the extend that the nature and legacy of legal humanism now deserve closer scrutiny. Building on the groundbreaking work by Douglas Osler, who has been critical of the traditional narratives, this volumeinterrogates the orthodox views regarding legal humanism and its legacy. Fundamentally reassessing the nature and impact of legal humanism on the narratives of European legal history, this volume brings together the foremost international experts in related fields of legal and intellectual history to debate the central issues. (shrink)

Developments and turning points in the interpretation of the parables of Jesus.Research into and interpretation of the parables of Jesus have in recent years attracted a tremendous amount of attention. In this article a survey is presented of the developments and the most important turning-points in the history of the interpretation of Jesus’ parables through all the ages of Christianity. A picture is drawn of the different stages of parable interpretation, starting with the allegorical method of interpretation, through the historical, (...) the moralistic, the eschatological and existential approach and up to the literary and pragmatic approaches of the last decade or so. Most attention has been given to the most recent developments, including some outstanding work amongst South African New Testament scholars. (shrink)

In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim that (...) such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem. (shrink)

Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions that are associated with the institution and (...) how we are incentivized to perform these actions. In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by extending it to institutions like property, promises and complex financial organisations like companies. We also highlight exactly how the incentivized action view differs from the Searlean view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and discuss some of the virtues of the incentivized action view. (shrink)

What does being money consist in? We argue that something is money if, and only if, it is typically acquired in order to realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of agents coordinating on acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange. What kinds of things can be money? We argue against the common view that a variety of things (notes, coins, gold, cigarettes, etc.) can be money. All monetary systems are (...) best interpreted as implementing the same basic protocol. Money, i.e. the thing that we coordinate on acquiring in order to lower our transaction costs, is, in all cases, a set of positions on an abstract mathematical object, namely a relative ratio scale. The things that we ordinarily call ‘money’ are merely records of positions on such a scale. (shrink)

In our earlier work, we argued, contra Searle, that institutional facts can be understood in terms of non-institutional facts about actions and incentives. Butchard and D’Amico claim that we have misinterpreted Searle, that our main argument against him has no merit and that our positive view cannot account for institutional facts created via joint action. We deny all three charges.

Is 'n transendentale kritiek religieus bepaald? deur V. Brümmer. -- Constitution and creativity in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, by A. L. Conradie. -- Studium Generale, deur H. J. De Vleeschauwer. -- Sociology of law and its philosophical foundtions, by H. Dooyeweerd. -- Beginvrae en antwoorde in der Wysbegeerte, deur P. G. W. Du Plesis. -- Max Scheler's concern with the highest perfection, by S. I. M. Du Plessis. -- Christelike wetenskap, highest perfection, by S. I. M. Deu (...) class='Hi'>Plessis. -- Christelike wetenskap, deur B. Duvenage. -- Malan's critical study, by H. Hart. -- Raakpunte vir 'n dialoog met 'n Christelike Wysbegeerte, deur A. M. T. Meyer. -- Nuwe gedagtes oor die begrip Natuurwet, deur A. H. Murray. -- Die voorwaardes vir die uitbou van 'n wysgerige antropologie, deur C. K. Oberholzer. -- De structuur van feit-en-betekenis, deur K. J. Popma. -- The relation of the arts to the presentation of the truth, by C. G. Seerveld. -- Gezag en vrijheid in het licht van Gods Woord, deur J. Stellingwerff. -- Voorveronderstellings vir 'n filosogie van die opvoeding, deur J. A. L. Taljaard. -- Objektiwiteit, sekularisasie en geskiedenis, deur N. T. Van der Merwe. -- Etiek: wetenskap van relasies, deur S. P. Van der Walt. -- Wetten en feiten, deur C. A. Van Peursen. -- Enige opmerkingen over entiteiten, deur H. Van Riessen. -- Richard Kroner on Herman Dooyeweerd, by C. Van Til. -- De mens in de taalkunde, deur P. A. Verburg, -- Enkele motieven van het anti-militair pacifisme, deur S, U. Zuidema. -- Publications of prof. dr. H. G. Stoker. Publikasies van prof. dr. H. G. Stoker (p. 303-311). (shrink)

Steve Jobs (1955-2011) was not only a businessman renowned for his legacy of technological innovation and entrepreneurship. His life history indicates eras or seasons as prankster, hippie, family man, and cancer fighter. This psychobiographical case study entailed a psychosocial-historical analysis of Jobs’s development interpreted through Levinson’s theory of the human life cycle, and was undertaken against the background of Merleau-Ponty’s ontological philosophy that elucidates a human science phenomenology where the individual cannot be separated from his/her social world. The primary objective (...) of this study was to uncover the eras and transitions within Jobs’s life cycle. The secondary objective was to illustrate and test the relevance of Levinsonian theory as applied to Jobs’s life. Jobs’s life cycle was uncovered through an analysis of published and publically available materials, which included both primary and secondary data sources. Alexander’s psychobiographical model was employed to extract salient evidence for analysis. A conceptual psychosocial-historical matrix guided the analysis. Key findings indicate that the central components of Jobs’s life and social world (e.g., his occupation, family, friendships and terminal illness) had a significant influence on his psychosocial development. In conclusion, Jobs’s development generally conformed to Levinsonian theory as well as to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology and illustrated the relevance of these conceptual models for understanding the individual’s connectedness to his/her social world. (shrink)

Sorrow’s Profiles: Grief, and Crisis in the Family . London, UK: Karnac Books. Soft cover (376 pages). ISBN-13: 978-1-85575-621-2 Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 11, Edition 1 May 2011, 87-92.

SummaryLooking at proof theory as an attempt to ‘code’ the general pattern of the logical steps of a mathematical proof, the question of what kind of rules can make the meaning of a logical connective completely explicit does not seem to have been answered satisfactorily. The lambda calculus seems to have been more coherent simply because the use of ‘λ’ together with its projection 'apply' is specified by what can be called a 'reduction' rule: β‐conversion. We attempt to analyse the (...) role of proof rules, making use of a set of formal rules designed to capture both the notions of proof theory and those of the lambda‐calculus: Martin‐Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory.RésuméSi on considère la théorie de la démonstration comme une tentative de ‘codifier’ les pas logiques d'une démonstration mathématique, on se rendra compte qu'on n'a pas répondu de façon satisfaisante à la question suivante: quelles sont les règies qui rendent complètement explicite le sens d'un connecteur logique? Le lambda‐calcul a été apparemment plus cohérent, tout simplement parce que l'utilisation du‘λ’ avec sa projection 'apply' est spécifiée par une regie de 'réduction': β‐conversion. Nous essayons d'analyser le rôle des règies de démonstration, en utilisant un système formel de règies conçu pour englober à la fois les notions de la théorie de la démonstration et celles du lambda‐calcul: la Théorie Intuitionniste des Types de Martin‐Löf.ZusammenfassungWenn man Beweistheorie als einen Versuch, ein allgemeines Muster der logischen Schritte in einem mathematischen Beweis zu kodifizieren, betrachtet, so scheint die Frage nach der Art von Regeln , die die Bedeutung von logischen Operatoren vollständig beschreiben, nicht zufriedenstellend beantwortet. Der Lambda‐Kalkül erscheint, kohärenter, einfach deshalb weil der Gebrauch von ‘λ’ zusammen mit dessen Projektion 'apply' durch Regeln bestimmt wird, die man 'Reduktions'‐Regeln nennen kann: β‐Konversion. Wir versuchen, die Rolle von Beweisregeln zu analysieren, indem wir ein Regelsystem verwenden, das sowohl die Begriffe der Beweistheorie als auch diejenigen des Lambda‐Kalküls erfasst, nämlich die Martin‐Löfsche Typentheorie. (shrink)